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Abstract. Conceived as a follow-up to recent efforts destined to supply .owl 
ontologies with relational tools of greater complexity, the present article focuses 
on four main paths, all of them consisting in providing biomedical ontologies with 
formal means to express (1) deviations from normality, (2) topological 
connectedness, (3) inherence and (4) causality and function. 
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Motivation 
Ontologies are no longer confined to Philosophy. Computer scientists are nowadays 
eager to dip into the philosophical wisdom pool, in search for new, more expressive, 
and most importantly, more accurate, coherent, and consistent ways to represent reality 
in its entirety. The latter is, as a matter of fact, one of the main aspects that have 
propelled traditionally philosophical issues, methods and approaches, into the limelight 
of applied science, and that have compelled IT researchers and engineers—most of 
them quite reticent vis-à-vis things philosophical—to lend ears to what comes from the 
depths of immemorial philosophical times. It is the promise of a global approach to 
reality, as opposed to the parochial endeavors promoted in pre-ontological KR 2  
pursuits, that gave rise to what we presently witness as “the ontological turn.” One can 
never overestimate the virtues of global thought, and the merits of a Weltanschauung, 
in untangling lower level scientific conundrums, and in ensuring global coherence, 
compatibility and interoperability. 
As a result, ontologies have been hijacked and turned into another KR style, one of 
many. As such, in order to allow for automated maneuverability via reasoning and 
consistency detection tools, and in order to provide for productive inference and 
analysis, they have to be endowed with expressive powers well beyond what traditional 
ontologies were about. Traditionally ontologies were little more than taxonomies of 
Existence/Being, hence based on “is a” hierarchies (aka subsumption hierarchies). As a 
KR style, however, users demand more tools, capable to express more intricate 
relations. These tools should also be more precise and more formally specified. 
This process of enhancing ontologies will preoccupy us in the following. 
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1. Background 
The present article constitutes a follow-up to the very successful [9], which sets upon 
the task of improving the reliability and precision of biological and medical ontologies. 
In short, the diagnostic put by the authors—and with which we happen to concur—is 
that most existing biological and medical ontologies can be bettered by adopting tools 
and methods inspired from formal logic and formal ontology. Such an endeavor is seen 
as bringing about a greater degree of rigor, which fosters interoperability and 
integration, and ultimately facilitates the handling of biomedical data in an efficient and 
unambiguous manner by both human operators and especially by automated devices. 
The concrete steps undertaken in this respect by [9] consist in (a) providing a 
formal (and ontologically sound) support to the relations currently used in most 
biomedical ontologies—namely is_a and part_of, and (b) enhancing the list of such 
relations with new ones in order to compensate for the paucity of expressive means of 
said ontologies. The former undertakes a reconstruction of these two relations within 
the language of first-order logic (FOL), considered by the authors to be a sufficiently 
expressive and rather uncontroversial framework. The second aspect involved in (a) is 
most likely less immune to controversy as it makes use of a proprietary (though 
free/open-source) ontological framework known as Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), 
which was expounded in a series of articles by B. Smith and P. Grenon ([1]-[8]). The 
ontological soundness of the two relations (is_a and part_of) is thus supposed to be 
ensured by situating them within the larger BFO schema. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: BFO diagram 
 
Built against an Aristotelian backdrop, the BFO framework makes use of a basic 
top-level distinction (“the great divide”) between two kinds of entities: substantial 
entities or continuants (entities that endure through time while maintaining their 
identity) on the one hand, and occurrents or perdurants (entities that happen, unfold, or 
develop in time) on the other. Corresponding to these two kinds of entities are two 
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basic and distinct perspectives that can be taken on the world, neither of which can 
fully capture or represent the features of reality represented by the other: these are the 
SNAP and SPAN perspectives or ontologies respectively. Each of these basic 
perspectives can also be used to represent entities at different levels of granularity, 
resulting in further perspectival subdivisions of the basic SNAP and SPAN ontologies. 
For our purposes here, suffices to mention that the SNAP ontology recognizes three 
major categories of continuants: dependent continuants, independent continuants and 
spatial regions, while SPAN includes processual entities and spatiotemporal regions. 
Step (b) proceeds by assuming a host of new primitive individual-level relations 
(i.e. relations between individuals)—e.g. part_of, instance_of, located_in, has_agent 
etc.3 This background is then used to construct the corresponding class-level relations 
(i.e. relations between classes), and to define new individual-level and corresponding 
class-level relations. As a result, a new ontology (dubbed Relation Ontology (RO)) 
emerges. As of January 2007, RO comprises thirteen class-level relations (see 
http://obofoundry.org/ro/). It is the aim of the present article to further enhance the list 
of relations in RO by including relations noticeably absent so far, such as lacks, 
has_function etc. 
2. Relations 
Our efforts have been channeled on four major fronts, all of them consisting in 
providing biomedical ontologies with formal means to express 1) deviations from 
normality, 2) topological connectedness, 3) inherence and, last but not least, 4) 
causality and function. The latter is, above all, the area most conspicuously missing 
from RO as it is right now. We have assumed the same prerequisites as RO, which is to 
say that FOL has been our language of our choice, while BFO our background 
ontology. As the relations we have designed not only complement existing RO 
relations, but make copious use of them, it is obvious that our additions have to be 
consistent with RO; we are, however, not aware of any formal consistency proofs 
concerning RO—with or without our additions—so our focus has been targeted at 
designing relations which are not overtly and prominently contradictory, though this is 
not to say that they may not prove as such upon further investigation. 
2.1. lacks_part 
Meant to express a shortfall from normality (e.g. “John lacks_part finger”), 
lacks_part would have to be a relation between an individual and a class/universal. 
Introducing a relation to this effect appears, by most accounts, as imperative, as the 
vast majority of medical observation data is constituted by so-called “negative 
findings” (“lacks one kidney,” “lacks sense of smell,” “lacks sense of pain”—see 
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/medo/negative_findings.pdf, [10]). In order to tackle this 
issue we focused first on finding an acceptable definition for the class-level relation 
canonically_has_part, for which we had to introduce a canonicity predicate C(p,t) (“p 
is a canonical anatomical structure at time t”). Finally the individual-level lacks_part 
relation emerges as definable in terms of instance_of, part_of and 
canonically_has_part. Aided by lacks_part, one could now easily construct a plethora 
                                                          
3 Individual-level relations will be written in boldfaced, while class level in italics. 
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of related relations (e.g. canonically_has_initial_part_one, 
canonically_has_at_least_one, lacks_function etc.), and express many otherwise 
inaccessible truths (e.g. “My hands lack fingers, therefore I lack fingers”). 
Two related philosophical issues had to be tackled in connection with this relation: 
(i) lacks_part obviously connotes normality, a notoriously thorny philosophical 
challenge, hence in designing an acceptable definition care had to be taken so as to 
keep matters as generic as possible, thus avoiding overt commitment to a philosophical 
stance or other; (ii) RO was supposed to target, by design, a canonical state of affairs 
(“John lacks_part finger” is not, for example, a sentence expressible in the 
Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA:  
http://sig.biostr.washington.edu/projects/fm/index.html)), hence lacks_part, and all the 
other associated relations are, prima facie, either unnecessary, or simply not to be 
included in RO. 
Let p, q, f and g be variables that range over individual anatomical structures, t, t’ 
range over time(s), P and F variables that range over anatomical structures universals. 
Let C(p, t) stand for “p is a canonical anatomical structure at time t.” 
We submit the following definitions: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]tqgtFggtqCtPqtqrt Flly_has_paP canonica ′∧′∃→′∧′′∀∀=Δ at   part_of at   finstance_o at   finstance_o ,
Δ
 
( ) ( )[ ]tqgtFggtqCtPqtqone Frtlly_has_paP canonica ′∧′∃→′∧′′∀∀= at   part_of at   finstance_o at   finstance_o !,_ , 
 
with ∃! defined in the usual manner: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]yxyAyxAxxxA =→∀∧∃=∃ Δ! . 
 
Informally this can be rendered as “P canonically_has_part(_one) F =df. all 
canonical instances of P have (at least) one part that is an instance of F;” e.g.: human 
canonically_has_part(_one) heart. 
 
( ) ( pftFffFparthasycanonicallPtPpPtFp  part_of at   finstance_o   at   finstance_o at   lacks_part 
*
∧¬∃∧∧∃=Δ )   __  
 
The formula denoted here by * will be dubbed in the following the “canonicity 
clause.” This reads, informally, as: “p lacks_part F =df. (there is a universal P such 
that P canonically_has_part F and p instantiates P) and (there is no instance of F that 
is part of p)];” e.g.: John lacks_part finger (N.B.: John lacks all fingers!). 
We can also define: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]tpftPpptfCtFftfPl_part_of F canonica at   part_of at   finstance_o at   finstance_o ∧∃→∧∀∀= ,  
 
Informally: “F canonical_part_of P =df. any canonical instance of F is part of an 
instance of P;” e.g.: human heart canonical_part_of human. 
As an immediate property one should obtain: 
 
( ) ( )tpCtFpF ,¬→∃ at   lacks_part , 
 
which says that if p lacks a part, then p cannot be canonical. 
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Another interesting (and also very intuitive) property: If (p lacks F at t & p part of 
p' at t) then p' lacks F at t. Formally: 
 
. tFptpptFp at   lacks at   part_of at   lacks ′ ′∧ →
 
(Think, for example, of “My hands lack fingers, therefore I lack fingers.”) 
Here are some other related definitions, more-or-less trivial and/or useful: 
 
( )tpftFfftFp at   part_of at   finstance_o at   st_onehas_at_lea ∧∃=Δ
Δ
 
[ ]tpftFfftFp at   part_of at   finstance_o at   y_onehas_exactl ∧∃= !
Δ
 
( )tpftPptttptPf at   part_of at   finstance_o earlier   rt_ofinitial_pa ∧′→′′∀∃∃=
( )tpftFftttftFp ′∧′→′′∀∃∃=Δ at   part_of at   finstance_o earlier  l_part has_initia  
 
The initial_part relation is primarily meant to address parthood in systems for 
which one can talk about a lifetime, as in, e.g., “John was born with (at least one) 
nipple.” Note, however, that these definitions also allow for “John was born with (at 
least one) tail.” We will be looking further for relations that prevent this. 
One trivial variation on the initial_part relation is: 
 
[ ]tpftFftttftFp ′∧′→′′∀∃∃=Δ at   part_of at   finstance_o earlier   l_part_onehas_initia !  
 
Example: “John was born with one head.” To exclude either of “John has at least 
one/has exactly one/was born with at least one/was born with exactly one tail,” one 
would have to add the canonicity clause throughout (where appropriate); e.g.: 
 
( )tpftFfftFp at   part_of at   finstance_o * at   east_oney_has_at_lcanonicall ∧∧∃=Δ  
 
or 
 
[ ]tpftFftttftFp ′∧′→′′∀∃∧∃=Δ at   part_of at   finstance_o earlier  *  neial_part_oy_has_initcanonicall ! , 
 
etc. 
For non-anatomical senses of “lacks” (“p lacks sense of smell,” “p lacks sense of 
pain,” “p lacks oxygen” etc.) one simply replaces the part_of and 
canonically_has_part relations in the above definition of p lacks_part F at t and P 
canonically_has_part F with the corresponding relations, just as suggested in [10]; 
e.g.: 
 
( )( ) tpffPtPpPtp at   ffunction_o at   finstance_o tion_at lacks_func ¬∃∧Φ∧∃=Δ . 
 
Here the monadic predicate Φ(P) stands for “P canonically has function” and is 
defined similarly to P canonically_has_part F: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]tqggtqCtPqtqP ′∃→′∧′′∀∀=Φ Δ at   ffunction_o at   finstance_o , . 
 
It is not clear so far what are the relevant relations involved in “p lacks sense of 
smell,” “p lacks sense of pain,” “p lacks oxygen” etc., however, it is a good bet that 
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they will have to be based on different relations than those uncovered so far, just as p 
lacks_function_at t is based on function_of (see below for a treatment of “function”). 
2.2. connected_to 
While some rudimentary topological relations are already included in RO, none of 
them can account for connectedness, which is a very important feature in Human 
Anatomy, among others. Two primitives were necessary in order to carry out the task 
of capturing connectedness as accurately as possible: a closure_of individual-level 
relation, and a fiat boundary predicate (FB(x)). These allowed us to construct two rival 
notions of connectedness, each with its advantages and drawbacks: (i) the first one 
follows rather closely standard set-theoretical topology (see [12], 
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/topo.html), by submitting the closure_of 
relation to Kuratowsly’s closure axioms, and by defining most of the basic notions 
(border, boundary, interior etc.); one notable difference is that standard topology has 
been given here a mereological reading (think “objects” as “sets of atoms”). The 
interesting novelty is the definition of strong connectedness as the connectedness of the 
interior(s) ([12]); (ii) the second route to connectedness is based on the notions of fiat 
and bona fide boundaries, developed in [13] 
(http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/fiatvs.pdf). Very briefly, two objects are 
considered connected if any partition of their mereological sum never yields pure bona 
fide boundaries, i.e., it always yields at least a patch of fiat boundary. 
In more detail, and assuming the above notations, we start by assuming as 
primitives: (a) “p closure_of q at t” (which yields a function p=c(q,t)), and (b) the 
usual mereological functions: mereological sum (x∪y), mereological complement ( x ), 
mereological intersection (x∩y) and mereological difference (x-y), governed by the 
corresponding axioms of mereology, plus the usual closure axioms (expansiveness, 
idempotence and, respectively, additivity): 
 
( ) ttxcx at   part_of ,  
( )( ) ( ) ttxcttxcc at   part_of ,,,  
( ) ( ) ( )tyctxctyxc ,,, ∪=∪ . 
 
We now define the notion of a boundary by means of a boundary function: 
 
( )txbytxy ,==Δat   fboundary_o , 
 
where b(x,t) is the boundary function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )txctxctxb ,,, ∩=Δ . 
 
We now have two ways of defining our target connected_to relation: 
 
1. Define first the interior i(x,t)=x-b(x,t) of an object. Further define “p connected_to 
q at t” as: 
 
( ) ( )   , , *p q t z y i p t i q t y z= ∀ ∀ ∪ = ∪ → *⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦connected_to at  
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where ** is: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )**       ,         ,   w w z t w c y t t w w y t w c z t t= ∃ ∧ ∨∃ ∧part_of at part_of at part_of at part_of at  
  
…meaning that two objects are connected if however we may split the 
mereological sum of their interiors into two parts y and z, then ** holds (i.e. either 
z overlaps with the closure of y, or y overlaps with the closure of z). This definition 
has been adapted from the strong connectedness definition introduced in 
Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science ([12]). 
A less intuitively attractive (in our opinion) alternative way of defining the 
connected_to relation, 4  would be to switch in the above definition the 
mereological sum of the interiors, with the interior of the mereological sum, as in 
the following formula: 
 
( )    , *p q t z y i p q t y z= ∀ ∀ ∪ = ∪ → *⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦connected_to at  
2. Introduce another primitive predicate, FB(y) meaning “y is a (patch of) fiat 
boundary.” With this, p connected_to q at t becomes: 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ]ttybbyFBbyzqpyztqp at   part_of at   toconnected_ ,′∧′∃→∪=∪∀∀= , 
 
…meaning that any partition of the mereological sum of the two objects never 
yields pure bona fide boundaries, i.e., it always yields at least a patch of fiat 
boundary. 
A few comments regarding these two major ways of capturing the intuitive notion 
of connectedness: 
 
1. Both these two definitions are rather strong in that they not only imply that the two 
objects are connected, but that, moreover, each one in part is a connected object 
(so they are not “spread” in space, as it were). The definitions can be reformulated 
so as to yield weaker conditions, however, such a weaker definition doesn’t prima 
facie seem to be of much interest in the field of biomedical ontologies (RO’s initial 
target). 
2. The first manner is closer to standard set-theoretic topology in defining most of the 
basic notions (closure, border etc.), the difference being mostly that standard 
topology has been given a mereological reading (think “objects” as “sets of 
atoms”). The interesting development/novelty remains the definition of strong 
connectedness as the connectedness of the interior(s). We are, at this point, not 
sure whether there are any interesting results in standard topology regarding strong 
connectedness. We are also having a hard time to think in topological terms of an 
instance of a connected set that is not strongly connected. As for the issue of two 
strongly connected sets, the following examples should shed some light: 
 
(0, 1) and [1, 2) are two disjoint, connected, but not strongly connected 
sets/intervals; 
(0, 1] and [1, 2) are two non-disjoint, connected, but not strongly connected 
sets/intervals; 
                                                          
4 see notes below containing some comparisons of connectedness with strong connectedness 
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(0, 2) and (1, 3) are two non-disjoint, connected, and strongly connected 
sets/intervals. 
 
It would, finally, be interesting to know whether there are disjoint pairs of sets 
that are strongly connected. 
 
3. The second definition is likely to be more successful and popular with circles of 
non-topologists, as the distinction between fiat and bona fide boundaries is 
sufficiently clear and intuitive. Some of the properties of the two types of 
boundaries have been formalized in [13]; nevertheless, even there, the distinction 
is assumed to be sufficiently clear from the get-go. One other reason why such a 
definition should be formulated in terms of fiat/bona fide is that connectedness in 
the realm of biology is supposed to capture essentially connected 
anatomical/biological structures, i.e., eventually, molecular/atomic bonds. 
Standard Euclidian topology certainly has very little to do with that. It would 
actually be very interesting to define a topology on R3 built explicitly onto such 
considerations. 
2.3. inheres_in 
Following the standard BFO practice, the individual-level inherence relation 
(inheres_in) is assumed as primitive. It is also postulated that its behaviour is (partly) 
governed, among others, by the well known “non-migration principle”—a staple of 
contemporary Aristotelian thinking. The class-level inheres_in relation follows swiftly 
from the individual-level version via some minimal logical maneuvering. 
In detail, and assuming we allow for multiple inherence (one and the same 
continuant may inhere in another continuant at the same time), things can be envisaged 
in the following manner: 
 
i. At the instance level one has the primitive “c1 inheres_in c2 at t” relation, 
satisfying the principle of non-migration (a inheres_in b at t & a exists_at t' 
→ a inheres_in b at t') and possibly other axioms ("There are no bare 
particulars" (meaning, roughly, that there are no particulars without qualities) 
etc.); 
ii. At the universal level we have the two definitions: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 _   _     _    &  _    C inheres in C c t c C t c c C t c c tΔ= ∀ ∀ → ∃⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦instance of at instance of at inheres in at  
 
and 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 _   _     _    &  _    C bearer of C c t c C t c c C t c c tΔ= ∀ ∀ → ∃⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦instance of at instance of at inheres in at . 
 
(c1, c2, are continuant instances, C1, C2 are continuant universals, t is a time 
instant.) 
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2.4. function_of 
The initial version of RO included two main relations purportedly dealing with 
causality: has_agent and has_participant, from which several minor variations have 
been also obtained (sometimes_participates_in, always_participates_in etc.). It was 
suggested that any future endeavors to capture the notion of function in biology would 
have to employ these relations. While we do think these relations are indicative of 
causality, we have preferred a different route in order to achieve a comprehensive 
formal treatment of causality and function. In this respect we have adopted a stance that 
has proved immensely successful in the science of the second part of the 20th century—
and in particular in applied science and engineering. Our motivation stems, in short, 
from the realization that biological organisms, and human organisms in particular, are 
paradigm examples of open systems. It is, hence, hardly surprising that an engineering 
treatment is perfectly suited to dealing with organisms, just as much as it is appropriate 
to dealing with machines and machineries. System(s) Theory5 (aka Systemics), the 
brainchild of a biologist, not only offers the perfect environment in which causal chains 
can be encoded, but provides full-blown solutions to the type of problems encountered 
in the activity of constructing the function-causality side of a biomedical ontology. We, 
hence, see it as imperative to adopt system-theoretic and cybernetic terminology: 6  
proceeding otherwise would amount, in fact, to rediscovering the wheel. 
Before proceeding to the unfolding of a detailed ST-style account of 
functional/causal relations, here are some comments on, and considerations about the 
depth and type of RO ST infusion we are envisaging. 
ST provides sine qua non tools for Engineering (Mechanical, Electrical/Electronics, 
Chemical etc.), also known as the “modular/systemic view/approach.” Some of its most 
important abstractions (system/module, input, output, state, feedback) will be used in 
our account. While Engineering has benefitted enormously from ST, it has also proven 
immensely successful in Social Sciences as well. ST constitutes, in our opinion, the 
most natural tool for the study of interconnected modules/black boxes. Most of our 
considerations will hence adopt an input-output angle, very useful in the study of 
complex systems such as the human body. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Interconnecting systems (serial, parallel, reaction (Cybernetics)) 
 
The parts that we will be using from ST have more to do with its mathematical 
projection (Dynamical Systems Theory), hence we will not employ notions like 
“holism,” “synergy,” “whole-ism,” “emergence,” which usually go with ST discourse. 
Nor will we be assessing aspects like controlability, stability etc., as they would exceed 
by far the scope of a simple RO enhancement. As a matter of fact (and this should 
                                                          
5 ST for short. 
6 In what follows, Cybernetics will be regarded as a proper part of Systems Theory. 
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attenuate the fears of those wary of intrusions from pseudo-ST mythology), the level at 
which we’ll be employing ST-notions is little more than skin deep; ST has been 
adhered to mostly for the sake of ensuring a minimal level of integration with all 
disciplines that use its highly interdisciplinary framework. As argued above, 
maintaining a connection with ST (be it minimal) will hopefully help us to avoid 
reinventing the wheel. 
In brief, we have assumed the relations of subfunction and section of a function as 
primitives; using these and some other existing RO relations, we managed to define a 
host of new function and causality related individual-level relations such as 
subsystem_of, function_of, has_function, has_output etc. together with the 
corresponding class-level relations. 
Without claiming to have solved some of the difficult (and genuine) philosophical 
issues surrounding the notion of a biological function, we do regard the infusion of 
system-theoretical terminology as our main contribution, and while we would have 
preferred that such system theoretic categories (system, subsystem, state evolution etc.) 
were included in BFO itself, including them in RO constitutes, in our opinion, the next 
best thing. 
The paradigm examples of relations that have guided our modeling process (the 
so-called “use cases”) are: 
 
kidney undergoes excretion process 
excretion process has_participant nephron  
excretion function implemented_by kidney//kidney implements excretion function 
kidney has_output urine//urine output_of kidney 
kidney has_input blood // blood input_of kidney 
excretion function function_of kidney//kidney has_function excretion function  
filtration subfunction_of excretion function 
nephron subsystem_of kidney wrt excretion function 
excretion process has_outcome urine // urine outcome_of excretion process 
excretion process has_outcome (clean) blood // (clean) blood outcome_of excretion 
process 
 
One of the challenges that is likely to complicate the picture considerably is the 
fact that systems can have more than one function, and more than one output. As a 
solution we have adopted a vector view of functions, hence speak of sections 
(projections) of functions. Ultimately, we have modelled the analysis by taking set 
theoretical procedures as main inspiration. Let us consider, in this respect, the 
following case study: 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Complex system case study 
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If we construe each of the components of the big system (dotted line) as having a 
transfer function (f1, ... f6) that turns its input into an output,7 and if we employ simple 
set theoretical operations (Cartesian product, composition and projection), we obtain 
for the big system a transfer function expressed by the following formula: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 2, , , , , ,f x z f x z f x z p f p f x z′ ′′= = D D , 
 
which is actually a pair of functions (a vector), where 
 
( ) ( ){ }1 2 6 1 3 1 2 4 1 3 1 2 41xf p f f f p f f p f p f f p f′ = = × × × ×⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦D D D D D D D D D , 
 
and 
 
( )2 5 2 3 1 2 4 1 4f p f f f p f f p f p f′′ ′= = × × ×⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦D D D D D D . 
 
f, hence, has two sections, f’ and f”. Note that f5 is a subfunction of f” but not of f’ 
(i.e. appears in f’’s functional decomposition but not in f”’s). We say that the system 
whose transfer function is f5 has no causal contribution to the f’ output. To adopt the 
terminology used in the paradigm examples: “S5 subsystem_of S wrt f” is true,” while 
“S5 subsystem_of S wrt f’ is not true.” We have, hence, tried to follow such procedures 
in proposing and analyzing new relations, hoping that our relations turn out to be useful. 
In the following, we will be adopting the following variable notations: c, c’, s, s’, 
s” range over continuant instances, f, f’, f” over function instances, p, p’ over process 
instances, t, t’, t” range over instants of time, T over temporal interval individuals. 
A first definition is: f function_of c =df. ∃t f inheres_in c at t, which simply says 
that if a function (ever) inheres in a continuant, then the continuant has that function. 
Far from elucidating the (presumably) difficult notion of function as vehiculated in 
philosophical circles, it should allow us to get the whole functional edifice off the 
ground. Its reciprocal (c has_function f) has the same definition. 
The following batch of relations should be taken as primitives. We trust, for now, 
that they are self explanatory, especially given the examples and case study above. 
 
f’ subfunction_of f (primitive) 
f has_subfunction f’ (primitive) 
f’ section_of f (primitive) 
f has_section f’ (primitive) 
s has_input c during T (primitive) 
c input_of s during T (primitive) 
s has_output c during T (primitive) 
c output_of s during T (primitive) 
 
Use cases for some of the above: 
 
this kidney has_output this urine sample during this time interval 
                                                          
7 This, as a matter of fact, is not a perfectly general situation, as systems do not necessarily have a transfer 
function. For illustration purposes, however, this should do. 
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this electrical impulse output_of this nerve during this time interval 
eliminate urine section_of excretion function 
blood cleaning section_of excretion function 
 
Note that both has_input and has_output have hitherto been designated as 
primitives, which is different from what one would have expected in view of our set 
theoretic inspiration. According to a set theoretical construal, given the input and the 
(transfer) function, one should be able to derive the output as the result of applying the 
function to the input. We have chosen not to reflect this in the general case, hence 
concede that the mathematical notion of function might not capture other meanings of 
the term (Biology, Philosophy etc.), where the “applying a function to an input” might 
be regarded as nonsensical. 
Other defined relations, bearing in mind the above primitives: 
c undergoes p =df. t’ first_instant p & t” last_instant p → (∀t) [t’ earlier t & t 
earlier t” → p has_participant c at t & (∀c’) (p has_participant c’ → c’ 
subsystem_of c at t)]; comment: for the duration of the process, c is the biggest system 
that participates in the process. 
s’ subsystem_of s at t =df. s’ part_of s at t & (∀f) [s has_function f → (∃f’) s’ 
has_function f’ & f’ subfunction_of f]; comments:” (a) the part’s functions are always 
subfunctions of the whole’s functions; (b) the dychotomy continuant/part_of and 
system/subsystem is meant to address calls for a functional (as opposed to 
“traditional”) anatomy (see [14]); (c) “subsystem” emerges as a restriction/child of 
part_of, wherby some continuant 
part_of some other continuant is a subsystem just in case it is not 
functionally/causally inert in whatever processes the encompassing continuant 
undergoes. The human vermiform appendix could be seen as a counterexample at this 
point, as a part of the canonical human body that is devoid of function (presumably 
vestigial). 
s’ subsystem_of s wrt f at t =df. s’ part_of s at t & s has_function f → (∃f’) s’ 
has_function f’ & f’ subfunction_of f. Comment: while in the previous relation the 
part was involved in all of the whole’s functions, this relation captures the contribution 
of a part with respect to a section of the whole’s function; example: the kidney 
implements the excretion function, however, the kidney’s main “functional unit” (the 
nephron) has no role in the kidney’s endocrine function. 
p has_outcome c =df. (∃s) [s undergoes p & t’ first_instant p & t” last_instant p 
→ s has_output c during (t’,t”)]; The reciprocal, c outcome_of p, would have the 
same definition. Comment: process p has continuant c as outcome if the system that 
undergoes the process has continuant c as output; e.g.: this breathing process 
has_outcome this volume of CO2. 
f realized_by p =df. (∃s) (s undergoes p & s has_function f); p realizes f has the 
same definition. Natural language rendering: a function is realized by a process if it is 
implemented by a system that undergoes the process in question; e.g.: excretion 
process realizes excretion function. 
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3. Open Issues, and Future Work 
Aside from supplying the universal-level correspondents of the above individual-level 
relations, we regard as imperative the tackling of the following two major technical 
issues: 
 
1. As things have been canvassed so far, it should make sense to proceed at 
splitting the outputs of a system according to the function sections, that is, it 
should make sense to talk about vector-style outputs: e.g. “kidney has_output 
(urine, blood).” The picture, however, has become very complicated. While 
vector-style functions might be easier to swallow, RO target users (medical 
informaticians and, eventually, clinical practitioners) might be put off by the 
increasingly complicated panorama of relations. What started off as an attempt 
to put forward a list of simple relations to be used as a first step towards 
computer-friendly medicine, has quickly escalated in complexity. The answer 
to this, we think, should be looked for in the complex nature of medical reality, 
and of reality in general. 
2. The matter of specifying/individuating (sub)systems other than by simply 
giving their function (i.e. by saying “the (sub)system” that does this or that) is, 
we think, very cumbersome. To rephrase, say s is a system having function f, 
and f’ is a subfunction of f. Is there such a thing as a subsystem s’ of s that 
implements or that has_function f’? If anything, this looks to be an issue 
regarding the expressive power of two languages: the functional language 
versus the structural one. To what extent are these comparable, or even 
interchangeable? 
4. Concluding Remarks 
A commonly held opinion among computer scientists and software engineers is that 
ontologies need to be more expressive. Enhancing their expressiveness can be done by 
providing them with means to capture many other relations, aside from the primordial 
ontological one (the is_a taxonomy). Some of these new additions have been dealt with 
extensively above, some (the more basic ones) in the initial RO paper ([9]). The most 
widespread computing tools used to represent ontologies in electronic format, OWL 
and its Protégé GUI (http://protege.stanford.edu/), certainly allow for such additions 
(recall the “Properties” tab in Protégé). However, by submitting to such demands from 
the community of ontology users, ontologies have overstepped their historic authority. 
They have effectively turned into theories, namely theories in .owl clothing. While we 
certainly do not find this as distressing in the slightest bit, we also find worth 
remarking that efforts aimed at regimenting scientific theories in the framework of FOL 
are far from new. 8  We would hence like to conclude by giving credit to a entire 
tradition in 20th century Philosophy of Science, and to express our hopes that the recent 
resurgence of .owl ontologies, and the assimilation of ontology development to a KR 
style, will lead to a better understanding and greater appreciation for a tradition 
frequently regarded as having little (or nothing) to do with concrete computational 
targets, but more with the esoteric part of man’s spiritual creations. 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., [15]. 
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